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A B S T R A C T
Amazon was the world's top Research and Development (R&D) firm in 2017. Its R&D investment was double that
of 2015, five times that of 2012, and ten times that of 2011.
Such a rapid and notable increase in R&D investment has raised the question of a new R&D definition and
focus in the digital economy, which Amazon insists includes both “routine or periodic alterations” (traditionally
classified as non-R&D) and “significant improvement” (classified as R&D).
Using an empirical analysis of Amazon's R&D model as a system, this paper attempts to provide a convincing
answer to this question.
It has been identified that Amazon, which is based on R&D as a culture, has been promoting companywide
experimentation to cause customers obsessed with making purchase decisions. This obsession has enabled
Amazon to deploy an architecture for participation that makes the most of digital technologies by harnessing the
power of users. Such user-driven innovation has accelerated a dramatic advancement of the Internet that, in
turn, has accelerated the co-emergence of soft innovation resources in the marketplace. This emergence has
activated a self-propagating function that has induced functionality development, leading to supra-functionality
beyond an economic value that satisfies a shift in customers’ preferences. While this system depends on the
assimilation capacity of soft innovation resources, Amazon has developed a high level of capacity supported by a
rapid and notable increase in R&D investment. The above efforts function in a virtuous cycle leading to the
transformation of “routine or periodic alterations” into “significant improvement.”
These findings give rise to insightful suggestions regarding a new concept of R&D in neo open innovation in
the digital economy.
1. Introduction
There is a crucial dilemma when opting for R&D expansion as it can
lead to productivity decline, caused by the two-faced nature of in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) centered on the ad-
vancement of the Internet. This has become a serious problem for ICT
firms [1,2]. Despite this, global ICT leaders have exhibited a remarkable
growth in R&D.
Fig. 1 illustrates the world's top 25 R&D leaders by their R&D ex-
penditure in 2017, which demonstrates a notable R&D growth rate in
software and Internet leaders in 2017 as 40.4% (Amazon), 12.7% (Al-
phabet), 8.8% (Microsoft), 28.5% (Huawei) and 24.5% (Apple) while
the growth rate in computer & electronics has been much lower, at
−3.2% (Samsung) and 5.0% (Intel). Noteworthy is Amazon's con-
spicuous jump. It invested US$ 22.6 billion R&D in 2017 and jumped up
to the ranks of the world's top R&D firm, surpassing rival global ICT
leaders. It is only in the last few years that Amazon's spending has
ranked among that of the potential global leaders in R&D.
The rapid increase in R&D spending showed no signs of slowing
down the pace in 2018. The amount spent by Amazon on R&D in 2018
is poised to surpass the GDP of Iceland, as demonstrated in Fig. 2 [5].
In corresponding to such a rapid and notable increase in R&D in-
vestment, Amazon has accomplished a skyrocketing increase in its
market capitalization (MC), as demonstrated in Fig. 3. It hit the US$ 1
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trillion MC level in 2018. Consequently, Amazon was close to being the
world's biggest Internet company in 2018, competing with Apple, as
demonstrated in Fig. 4. It briefly exceeded the level of Apple in De-
cember 2018 and also in January 2019, as demonstrated in Figs. 4-2.
Recalling Amazon's conspicuous, rapid and notable increase in R&D
investment, as reviewed in Fig. 1, it is naturally assumed that its sky-
rocketing increase in market capitalization can be attributed to its R&D
investment.
However, Amazon's rapid and notable increase in R&D investment
has raised two questions.
First, the definition of R&D in the digital economy. The authors have
pointed out the structural change of the concept of output in the digital
economy and revealed the limitation of GDP in measuring the output of
the digital economy [9,10] by demonstrating the increasing depen-
dence on uncaptured GDP [11–13]. Amazon's rapid and notable in-
crease in its R&D investment amid the digital economy prompts the
possibility of a structural change in the concept of R&D, similar to the
output. Amazon insists on describing “technology and content,” not “R
&D” as its “R&D investment” in its annual reports1. This implies pro-
found insights into the R&D model in the digital economy.
Second, there is the question of a disruptive business model that
provides a reasonable solution to the dilemma between R&D expansion
and productivity decline. Notwithstanding the fear of such a dilemma,
Fig. 1. Amazon's Conspicuous Jump into the Position of World's R&D Leader in 2017. Original sources: [3,4].
Fig. 2. Trends in Amazon's R&D investment and Iceland's GDP (2010-2018).
Sources: [6]: and Quartz projection.
Fig. 3. Trend in Amazon's market capitalization (2006-2018).
Source: [7].
1 In this paper comparative analysis was conducted using Amazon's ex-
penditures for “technology and content” as its R&D investment first, and then
assessed their performance for examining the validity of this treatment.
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Amazon has been accomplishing notable performance [14] by fully
utilizing such a rapidly increasing R&D. Amazon has invested con-
siderable resources into extremely innovative business areas, such as
Amazon Web Services (AWS), Kindle, Alexa (Amazon Echo) and
Amazon Go, which accelerate the exploration of the Amazon empire
chain and big data collection system.
In parallel with such innovation challenges at the forefront, it en-
deavors to absorb soft innovation resources (SIRs)2, such as sleeping
and untapped resources [15], from external markets and assimilate
them into its business model. This transforms “routine or periodic al-
terations” (classified as non-R&D in the traditional accounting stan-
dard) into “significant improvement” (similarly classified as R&D),
leading to the company becoming the world's top R&D firm.
The advancement of the Amazon empire chain and subsequent big
data collection system contributes to the absorption of broad soft in-
novation resources. Rapid and notable R&D investment contributes to
enhancing assimilation capacity.
Since these endeavors can be expected to trigger the new concept of
R&D in neo open innovation, an empirical analysis of Amazon's in-
itiative may lead the way in revealing the significance of transformation
of the R&D concept in the digital economy.
In light of Amazon's notable business performance based on its
unique business model, to date, a significant number of studies have
attempted to analyze its notable performance and unique business
model (e.g., [14,16,17]. In addition, given such a rapid and notable R&
D increase leading Amazon to become the world's top R&D firm in 2017
over such a short period of time, as reviewed above, a number of
questions were raised about its R&D model, such as, is it really R&D or
merely routine or periodic alterations (e.g., [4,18]? However, inside the
black box of its unique model, much has remained unveiled. This can
largely be attributed to Amazon's secretiveness, which is part of its CEO
Jeff Bezos's policy [19]. As a matter of fact, he has himself confessed
that “I have to be very choosy” [20].
Under such constraints, analyses of Amazon's unique R&D model
from the viewpoint of providing a solution to the dilemma between R&
D expansion and productivity decline that the majority of global ICT
firms have been confronting in the digital economy [1,2] are limited.
Some exceptions can be seen in the analyses from the viewpoints of
co-emergence of innovation with its counterparts [21] demonstrated
the significant effects of the collaboration with its competitors, known
as coopetition. They demonstrated that, by collaborating with its
competitors, Amazon has succeeded in building new capabilities,
gaining better leverages and boosting its brand and technologies [22]
also identified that, by making itself indispensable to e-commerce,
Amazon has enjoyed receiving business from its rivals. [23]; based on
O'Reilly's postulation of the “architecture of participation” [24], de-
monstrated that Amazon has succeeded in deploying this architecture
and has been making most of the digital technologies by harnessing the
power of its users.
The authors, in their preceding studies, demonstrated the sig-
nificance of the coopetition strategy in the conspicuous performance
accomplished by Canon (Japan's leading multinational corporation
specializing in the manufacturing of optical products, similar to
Amazon) [25,26]. Also, based on this finding, they postulated the sig-
nificance of neo open innovation in the digital economy as a promising
solution to such a dilemma [1,2]. Examination of this postulation, by
analyzing Amazon's R&D model as a system, is expected to shed light on
the transformative direction towards a new concept of R&D in the di-
gital economy.
Utilizing a techno-metrics approach, together with intensive litera-
ture reviews, this paper attempts to elucidate this dynamism. An em-
pirical analysis was conducted, focusing on Amazon's R&D performance
by absorbing external innovation resources, particularly soft innovation
resources, and assimilating them into its business.
Based on R&D as a culture of the company, Amazon has been en-
couraging companywide experimentation to make customers obsessed
with making purchase decisions. This endeavor has enabled Amazon to
deploy architecture for participation, which has made the most of
Fig. 4. Market capitalization of the top internet companies worldwide (as of May 2018) [68,69].
Source: [8].
2 See 4.3 the detailed concept of SIRs.
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digital technologies by harnessing the power of its users. Such user-
driven innovation accelerated the dramatic advancement of the
Internet, which, in turn, accelerated co-emergence, awakening, and the
inducement of soft innovation resources in the marketplace. Emerged
soft innovation resources activated a self-propagating function, which
induced functionality development, leading to supra-functionality be-
yond an economic value that satisfies a shift in customers’ preferences.
While this system depends on the assimilation capacity of soft in-
novation resources, Amazon has developed this capacity to a high level,
supported by a rapid and notable increase in R&D investment. The
above efforts functioned as a virtuous cycle, leading to transforming
“routine or periodic alterations” into “significant improvement” during
the R&D process.
These findings give rise to insightful suggestions about the new
concept of R&D in neo open innovation in the digital economy.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews Amazon's
unique R&D model. Amazon's R&D, scope, definition, and methods of
implementation are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 elucidates Ama-
zon's R&D inducement dynamism. Section 5 summarizes the note-
worthy findings, policy suggestions, and future research.
2. Amazon’s unique R&D model
2.1. Amazon: R&D as a culture
Amazon has been endeavoring to be an R&D-driven company since
its inception in 1994, as demonstrated in Table 1.
With such an R&D-driven innovation-seeking strategy, Amazon of-
fered customers a lot more choice, speed, reliability and superior cus-
tomer service, thereby proving its resilience against the bursting of the
dotcom bubble in 2000 [27].
To better understand the origin of Amazon's R&D strategy, we can
look at its founder and CEO Jeffery (Jeff) [28] letter to shareholders
[28]. In the letter he stressed that:
“All the effort we put into technology might not matter that much if we
kept technology off to the side in some sort of R&D department, but we don't
take that approach. Technology infuses all of our teams, all of our processes,
our decision-making, and our approach to innovation in each of our busi-
nesses. It is deeply integrated into everything we do.” He added, “these
techniques are not idly pursued they lead directly to free cash flow.”
This quote explains the importance of R&D activities while at the
same time highlighting aspects of Amazon's culture: innovation and
growth are built into every segment of the company, not just R&D.
2.2. Fundamental business principle
This culture has led to Amazon establishing its fundamental busi-
ness principle characterized by (i) Amazon doctrine, (ii) leadership
principles, (iii) customer service philosophies, and (iv) experimenta-
tion.
2.2.1. Amazon doctrine
Amazon's business management has been conducted in a consistent
and systematic way as a system for improving customer experience
based on the Amazon doctrine, as was explained by Bezos in 2012 as:
“Above all else, align with customers. Win when they win. Win only when
they win” [29].
2.2.2. Leadership principles
Amazon has a unique culture of hiring and developing leaders with
a focus on the following 14 leadership principles that have guided and
shaped the company's decisions and its distinctive entrepreneurial
culture. These Amazon leadership principles were set in stone to build a
strong entrepreneurial and highly execution-based culture. Every em-
ployee is expected to adhere to these principles, and the firm tests all
future hires on the same criteria (Bharti, 2015).
(i) customer obsession; (ii) ownership; (iii) invent and simplify; (iv) be
right a lot; (v) learn and be curious; (vi) hire and develop the best;
(vii) insist on the highest standards; (vii) think big; (ix) bias for
action; (x) frugality; (xi) earn trust; (xii) dive deep; (xii) have
backbone, disagree and commit; and (xiv) deliver results [30].
2.2.3. Customer service philosophies
As has been clearly explained in his doctrine and also stressed in the
top 14 of leadership principles, Amazon is eager to receive consumer
feedback, and Bezos has spread customers’ focus as a mantra
throughout the organization [27]. He has taken the philosophy of truly
caring for the customer and ushered it into the digital era. He has built a
company from the ground up purely based on the unbending, un-
yielding philosophy of serving the customer across all departments.
Such customer service philosophies have been realized in the top
ranking of customer satisfaction, as demonstrated in Table 2.
Table 2 compares trends in customer satisfaction with Internet retail
business in the US over the period from 2000 to 2017. Looking at
Table 2 we note that Amazon's Internet retail maintains the top cus-
tomer satisfaction level over the whole period (except in 2004 and
2006, when book-selling company Barnes & Noble slightly exceeded
Amazon's satisfaction level).
2.2.4. Experimentation
Experimentation has been playing a crucial role in Amazon's busi-
ness deployment. Bezos has encouraged experimentation by stressing
that, “Experiments are key to innovation because they rarely turn out as you
expect and you learn so much.” Innovators like Bezos see the world as a
laboratory [32].
At Amazon, experimentation is always occurring, initiated by em-
ployees in broad fields throughout the company, and ideas are con-
stantly being presented to Bezos, leading to satisfying the first leader-
ship principle: Customer obsession. Motivated employees understand
that these ideas are going to be altered in many ways [33].
Bezos, in his 2013 letter to shareholders [34], stressed that:
“Innovation comes from distributed decision-making. Top-down
teams are effective at optimizing existing processes and enforcing the
completion of work, but only decentralized, bottom-up teams can
consistently generate new ideas.”
He realizes that, “We don't make money when we sell things. We make
money when we help customers make purchase decisions” [20]. Amazon's
CEO is always attempting experiments to make customers to be ob-
sessed with making the purchase decision.
2.3. Resource allocation strategy
Most of Amazon's profits come from its high-tech division, such as
its cloud computing operation and AWS. These profits have been re-
invested in its business and employees, not in dividends and buybacks.
Amazon has not paid a dividend since its initial public offering (IPO) in
Table 1
Brief chronology of Amazon's major steps to becoming an innovation giant.
1994 Founded
1997 IPO
2002 AWS envisioned
2005 Amazon Prime
2006 AWS opened to outside customers
Amazon Elastic Computer Cloud (Amazon EC2)
2007 Amazon Kindle
2010 Migrated retail web services to AWS
2011 Kindle Fire
2014 Amazon Echo (Alexa Voice Service)
2016 Amazon Go store
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1997, nor has it done any buybacks of its shares since 2012. That
strategy is reflected in spending on research and development activities,
which has led to Amazon becoming the world's top R&D firm over a
short period of time.
2.4. Basic model for R&D
Notwithstanding a rapid and notable increase in expenses for
business activities generally described as “R&D,” based on its basic
principle for customer service, Amazon insists on describing them as
“technology and content” in its annual report [35].
Amazon has invested considerable resources in extremely in-
novative business areas such as AWS, Kindle, Alexa and Amazon Go.
In parallel with such forefront innovation, Amazon is endeavoring
to absorb soft innovation resources (SIRs) from external markets and
assimilate them into its business model, which transforms “routine or
periodic alterations” business activities into “significant improvement”
ones as reviewed earlier.
This transformation depends on its high level of assimilation capa-
city, which can be attributed to the rapid and notable increase in its R&
D investment, and also to the absorption of broad soft innovation re-
sources based on the Amazon empire chain and big data collection
system, together with the deployment of architecture for participation
that harnesses the power of its users [23].
2.5. R&D structure
2.5.1. Scope
Amazon has been encompassing a broad area of activities such as
research, design, development, and maintenance of both new and ex-
isting products and services in its “technology and content” business
activities. It accomplishes these activities in such broad scope si-
multaneously with the principle that its business should not be man-
aged by separating activities by type, as classified in the traditional
accounting standard.
2.5.2. Costs
Costs for “technology and content” activities consist primarily of
expenses for employees and infrastructure costs as follows:
(i) Expenses for employees
Payroll and expenses for employees involved in the research and
development of new and existing products and services, development,
design, and maintenance of its websites, curation, and display of pro-
ducts and services made available on its websites.
(ii) Infrastructure costs
Servers, networking equipment, and data center-related deprecia-
tion, rent, utilities, and other expenses necessary to support AWS, as
well as other efforts.
2.5.3. Management policy
Its management has been conducted in a consistent and systematic
way by improving customer experience based on the Amazon doctrine,
explained by Bezos in 2012, as described earlier.
(i) Basic philosophy
Manage these costs for “technology and content” activities collec-
tively, as investments being made on behalf of its customers to improve
their experiences.
(ii) Operation policy
Manage the total investment in its employees and infrastructure
across all its products and services, not separating activities by type as
classified in the traditional accounting standard, as mentioned above.
Table 2
Amazon's position in customer satisfaction in the US (2000-2017).
Source: American Customer Satisfaction Index [31].
Note: Figures in the table indicate scores of customer satisfaction: - indicates not measured; All Others represents the remainder of the total industry market share,
less the market shares of the ACSI-measured companies.
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2.6. R&D inducement dynamism
Amazon's business model and its endeavors to be at the frontier of
innovation challenge, such as AWS, Kindle, Alexa and Amazon Go, have
developed its growing empire, and also the subsequent big data col-
lection system, as well as the architecture for participation.
These chain, system, and the architecture have enabled Amazon to
absorb external innovation resources extensively and assimilate them
into its indigenous business model. This assimilation has transformed
“routine or periodic alterations” activities into “significant improve-
ment” activities, as illustrated in Fig. 5.
3. Amazon’s R&D
3.1. Description of R&D investment
Amazon has been pursuing identical innovation endeavor by in-
sisting on describing its business activities, which are generally con-
sidered to be R&D investment, as “technology and content.” Table 3
compares this concept with R&D conducted by Apple.
Sources: Amazon.Com, Inc. 2017 annual report (2018a) [35]. Apple
Inc. 2017 annual report (2018) [67].
Similar to other ICT leaders, while Apple has been stressing the
significance of continued R&D, licensing and mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) for ensuring a continual and timely flow of competitive pro-
ducts, services and technologies to the marketplace, Amazon has been
insisting on collective securement and management of costs for broad
areas of employees (involved in the research and development of new
and existing products and services, development, design, and main-
tenance of AWS, curation and display of products and services made
available on AWS) and infrastructure (including servers, networking
equipment, and data center-related depreciation, rent, utilities, and
other expenses necessary to support AWS) for offering a wide variety of
products and services to its customers.
3.2. The significance of technology and product concept – debate with the
Securities and Exchange Commission
Amazon's profound implications on its unique R&D model is un-
veiled by a series of letters that the US Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) sent to Amazon executives during the fall and winter
of 2017-18 and released to the public in April 2018, the SEC urged
Amazon to disclose its R&D spending as other companies do [15] 3.
3.2.1. SEC (27 Sep. 2017)
Tell us and disclose in future filings the total amount of research and
development costs charged to expense for each year presented in the
consolidated statements of operations as required by ASC (Accounting
Standards Codification).
3.2.2. Amazon (26 Oct. 2017)
Our business model encourages simultaneous research, design, develop-
ment, and maintenance of both new and existing products and services. For
example, our teams are constantly working to build new Alexa skills and
simultaneously maintain current skills, and these activities are within a
continuum of those described in ASC 730-10-55-1 and 2 (see below) and
are not easily distinguishable operationally.
3.2.3. SEC (24 Nov. 2017)
Disclose the total amount of research and development costs
charged to expense for each year presented in the consolidated state-
ments of operations as required by ASC 730-10-55-1.
3.2.4. Amazon (21 Dec. 2017)
Because of our relentless focus on innovation and customer obsession,
we do not manage our business by separating activities of the type that
under ASC 730-10-55-1 are “typically … considered” research and
Fig. 5. Scheme of Amazon's unique R&D model.
Table 3
Comparison of R&D investment description between amazon and apple (2017).
Category Description
Amazon Technology and content Technology and content costs include payroll and related expenses for employees involved in the research and development of new and
existing products and services, development, design, and maintenance of our websites, curation and display of products and services
made available on our websites, and infrastructure costs. Infrastructure costs include servers, networking equipment, and data center
related depreciation, rent, utilities, and other expenses necessary to support AWS, as well as these and other efforts. Collectively, these
costs reflect the investments we make to offer a wide variety of products and services to our customers.
Apple Research and development Because the industries in which the Company competes are characterized by rapid technological advances, the Company's ability to
compete successfully depends heavily upon its ability to ensure a continual and timely flow of competitive products, services and
technologies to the marketplace. The Company continues to develop new technologies to enhance existing products and services, and to
expand the range of its offerings through R&D, licensing of intellectual property and acquisition of third-party businesses and technology.
3 In light of the vast amounts of money coming and going from particular
segments of ICT giants such as Google's YouTube and Amazon's AWS and Alexa,
the SEC has paid special attention to Amazon's allocation of R&D spending.
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development from our other activities that are directed at ongoing in-
novation and enhancements to our innovations. Instead, we manage the
total investment in our employees and infrastructure across all our product
and service offerings, rather than viewing it as related to a particular pro-
duct or service; we view and manage these costs collectively as investments
being made on behalf of our customers to improve the customer experience.
We believe this approach to managing our business is different from the
concept of planned and focused projects with specific objectives that were
contemplated when the accounting standards for research and development
were developed under FAS 2 (Financial Accounting Standards). Given the
significant breadth of projects and improvements that we have underway,
our employees routinely work concurrently on multiple projects, including
projects that could be defined as research and development in nature and
also more routine, ongoing activities to refine, enrich, or otherwise improve
or adapt our existing products and services. Similarly, our activities may
focus on developing new products and services, but these activities often
result, in whole or in part, in enhancements to existing products and ser-
vices.
3.2.5. SEC (22 Jan. 2018)
If you are unable to identify or estimate research and development
costs, explain in detail the reasons for your inability.
3.2.6. Amazon (16 Feb. 2018)
In reassessing this conclusion in response to your comment, we dis-
cussed with our investor relations department whether quantifying tradi-
tional research and development costs within the scope of ASC 730-10-55-1
would be meaningful or useful for investors, and we also reviewed our
earnings call transcripts for the past three years to see whether investors
ask questions about research and development costs within the scope of
ASC 730-10-55-1. These discussions and review reaffirmed that such costs
are not material for two reasons. First, as discussed above, because of the
range of innovation activities we undertake to support the hundreds of
millions of different products and services that we offer, aggregate research
and development cost data would not indicate any particular area of ac-
tivity and would not reveal trends with regard to development efforts that
are material to an understanding of our business. Second, we believe that
distinguishing between costs attributable to activities of the type described
in ASC 730-10-55-1 and those attributable to activities described in ASC
730-10-55-2 would be confusing and misleading to investors, as the re-
sulting disclosures would not fairly present the investments we make in
order to offer a wide variety of products and services to our customers.
3.2.7. SEC (9 Mar. 2018)
We have completed our review of your filing. We remind you that
the company and its management are responsible for the accuracy and
adequacy of their disclosures, notwithstanding any review, comments,
action or absence of action by the staff.
3.3. Amazon's claims to the traditional R&D definition
The US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) provided
by FASB-ASC4 illustrates activities typically included and excluded
from R&D by defining Research & Development [36].5 While the former
activities correspond to those of contributing to significant improve-
ment, the latter activities contribute only to routine or periodic al-
terations (see the details of the illustration in Appendix 1).
Amazon claims that the boundary between the two types of activ-
ities has been blurring in the digital economy, and also that it is difficult
to separate them, as its R&D activities are implemented in such a way as
simultaneous research, design, development, and maintenance of both
new and existing products and services occur in a holistic business
operation. Also, Amazon's R&D has been conducted in transforming
routine or periodic alterations into significant improvement during the
R&D process as it absorbs soft innovation resources from external en-
vironments and assimilates them into its routine or periodic alterations
activities, leading to the transformation of these activities into activities
that lead to significant improvement.
4. Amazon’s R&D inducement dynamism
4.1. Exponential increase in R&D triggered by AWS-based services
Amazon's business model and endeavors to be at the frontier of
innovation challenge in AWS, Kindle, Alexa and Amazon Go develop its
growing empire, fusing the physical and the digital toward “selling
anything that can be sold online” and also the subsequent big data
collection system, as demonstrated in Fig. 6.
It should not be overlooked that the smooth establishment of such a
system can also be attributed to its intensive lobbying efforts, as the
Amazon empire has been enabled by breaking through traditional
regulations and the protection of existing industries. This breakthrough
accelerates the blurring of the boundary between the two types of ac-
tivities reviewed in the preceding section. Fig. 7 demonstrates trends in
lobbying intensity to White House offices, legislative entity, and other
executive entities in the period 2000-2017. Fig. 7 demonstrates clearly
how Amazon deployed intensive lobbying efforts in undertaking new
services, such as AmazonFresh grocery delivery in 2007, Sunday de-
livery in partnership with the Postal Service in 2012, drone delivery in
2013, and cloud services procurement with military significance in
2016.
Expenditure for such lobbying efforts has increased dramatically
from the beginning of the second decade of this century, amounting to
more than double the similar expenditure initiated by Apple, as de-
monstrated in Fig. 8.
From November 2010 all Amazon's retail web services have been
transformed into AWS-based services by migrating to AWS [38]. This
transformation has leveraged a dramatic increase in R&D (expenses on
technology and content) aiming at offering a wide variety of products
and services to its customers. Its R&D exceeded that of Apple from 2011
and triggered its lead, as demonstrated in Fig. 9. Since then Amazon
has transformed into a highly R&D-intensive firm, as demonstrated by
the notable increase in its R&D intensity (ratio between R&D and sales),
as demonstrated in Fig. 10. While an increase in R&D contributes to an
increase in sales, which increases profits, Amazon reinvests such profits
to R&D based on its resource allocation strategy, as reviewed earlier.
Consequently, Amazon's R&D intensity has continued to increase
since 2010, whereas this intensity was not time-dependent before 2009,
as demonstrated in Table 4.
where t: time trend, D: dummy variables (D1: 2000-2009=1, other
years= 0; D2: 2010-2017=1, other years= 0).
The figures in parentheses indicate t-statistics: All are significant at
the 1% level, except * is not significant.
Table 4 demonstrates that R/S has increased exponentially since
2010, whereas this intensity was not time-dependent before 2009.
Consequently, above transformation into AWS-based services in
2010 has triggered extremely high-level R&D intensity (higher than
double that of Apple's intensity level), as compared in Table 5.
4 The Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB).
5 Research is a planned search or critical investigation aimed at discovery of
new knowledge with the hope that such knowledge will be useful in developing
a new product or service (hereinafter “product”) or a new process or technique
(hereinafter “process”) or in bringing about a significant improvement to an
existing product or process. Development is the translation of research findings
or other knowledge into a plan or design for a new product or process or for a
significant improvement to an existing product or process, whether intended for
sale or use. It includes the conceptual formulation, design, and testing of pro-
duct alternatives, construction of prototypes, and operation of pilot plants.
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4.2. User-driven innovation induced by R&D-driven business model
Such a spiraling increase in Amazon's R&D has enabled Amazon to
offer a wide variety of products and services to its customers, corre-
sponding to its very first leadership principle: Customer obsession as
reviewed in 3.1.
This accomplishment is evidenced by the high level of its stock
prices, as demonstrated in Fig. 11 and Table 6. This high level of prices
has led to the skyrocketing increase in Amazon's market capitalization,
as reviewed earlier in Figs. 3 and 4.where ST: stock prices, S: sales, OI:
operating income, R: R&D expenditure, OCF: operating cash flow.
Translog (transcendental logarithmic) expansion on the first term:
ln ST= A + a ln S + b ln OI + c ln R + d ln OCF
Regression analysis by backward elimination method at 20% sig-
nificance level identifies.
ln ST= A+ b ln OI+ c ln R in both firms examined as the affluence
of OCF can be appraised by OI and future prospects of these firms can be
demonstrated by R, rather than S growth.
Table 6 demonstrates that Amazon largely depends on R&D for of-
fering a wide variety of products and services to its customers, but not
significantly on operating income (OI) in its stock prices formation,
while Apple depends on both OI and R&D aiming at improving its de-
veloped hardware and software every year. This analysis supports the
postulation that Amazon has provided qualified multi-functional pro-
ducts and services to its customers, corresponding to its first leadership
principle (customer obsession), using an R&D-driven business model.
The offering of such a wide variety of products and services, in turn,
has induced user-driven innovation, typically observed in the invention
of the Kindle [41]. The Kindle tablet came into existence defined purely
by customers' desires rather than engineers’ preferences (Baldacci,
2014).
Above contrast in R&D model between Amazon and Apple can be
highlighted by comparing their development trajectories of focal in-
ventions as AWS – Kindle – Alexa -Amazon Echo in Amazon, and PC –
iPod – iPhone – iPad - HomePod in Apple. Fig. 12 compares develop-
ment trajectories of these core inventions in two firms.
Fig. 12 highlights identity of Amazon's R&D-driven business model
by contrasting with that of Apple focusing on their core inventions as
summarized in Table 7.
Such multi-functional products/services for new experiences to
customers oriented business model has enabled Amazon to absorb
Fig. 6. Amazon's growing empire by final product category.
Source: Watanabe et al. (2018a) [70].
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external resources extensively and assimilate them into its indigenous
business. Amazon has deployed the “architecture of participation,” thus
making the most of digital technologies by harnessing the power of its
users to create even more value [23], as illustrated in Fig. 13. “Archi-
tecture of participation” was postulated by [24]; and implies that users
help to extend the platform.
Amazon's deployment of this strategy is quite similar to that of
Canon, known as a coopetition strategy [42]. This strategy harnesses
the vigor of mobile phone development in the consumer market le-
veraged by users, based on coopetition between Canon's printers, de-
veloped based on its own learning, and personal computers (PCs) de-
veloped by its rival firms [26], as illustrated in Fig. 14.
[21] demonstrated the significant effects of Amazon's coopetition.
They demonstrated that, by collaborating with its competitors, Amazon
has succeeded in building new capabilities, gaining better leverages and
boosting its brand and technologies.
[43] also demonstrated Amazon's strategic action for coopetition.
They stressed that Amazon seized the strategic opportunities presented
by the successive wave of disruption, ruthlessly cannibalizing its own
business where necessary.
e-books were inevitable, so Amazon launched the Kindle, to which
customer information and scale in data processing are critical, so it sold
cloud services to its competitors. Unlike many of his rivals, Bezos saw
business architecture as strategically valuable, not a given. He did not
harness technology to the imperatives of his business model; rather, he
adapted his business model to the possibilities of technology.
Like its willingness to sustain losses, this feature of Amazon's power
largely confounds contemporary antitrust analysis, which assumes that ra-
tional firms seek to drive their rivals out of business. Amazon's game is more
sophisticated. By making itself indispensable to e-commerce, Amazon en-
joys receiving business from its rivals, even as it competes with them [22].
Fig. 7. Trend in Amazon's lobbying intensity (2000-2017).
Source: [37].
Fig. 8. The trend in expenditure for lobbying at amazon and apple (2000-
2017).
Source: [37].
Fig. 9. The trends in R&D investment at amazon and apple (2008-2017).
Sources: Amazon.Com, Inc. 2017 annual report (2018a) [35]. Apple Inc. 2017 annual report (2018) [67].
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4.3. Neo open innovation activating a self-propagating function
User-driven innovation based on architecture of participation ac-
celerates the dramatic advancement of the Internet, as O-Reilly's pos-
tulate of architecture of participation is a Web 2.0 concept in which a
community of users contributes to the content or to the design and
development process. Advancement of the Internet, in turn, accelerates
co-emergence, awakening and inducement of soft innovation resources
(SIRs) in the marketplace as illustrated in Fig. 15 [2,45]. Thus, co-
evolutionary co-emergence of user-driven innovation and emergence of
SIRs can be expected. Here, SIRs are considered as a condensate and
crystal of the advancement of the Internet and consist of the Internet
based resources that have been either sleeping or untapped or are re-
sults of multisided interaction in the markets where consumer is
looking for functionality beyond an economic value. The common
feature of SIRs is that they are not accountable in the traditional GDP
terms [1,2].
The authors in previous studies stressed the significance of
increasing dependence on uncaptured GDP6 by postulating that the
Internet promotes a free culture that provides utility and happiness to
people but cannot be captured through GDP. This added value of pro-
viding people with utility and happiness, which extends beyond eco-
nomic value, is defined as uncaptured GDP [11,12].
The shift in people's preferences from the economic value to the
supra-functionality beyond an economic value (encompassing social,
cultural, and emotional values)7 induces the further advancement of the
Internet, which intensifies the increasing dependence on uncaptured
GDP. User-driven innovation further accelerates this inducement.
Thus, spinoff from co-evolution among traditional ICT, captured
GDP, and economic functionality to new co-evolution among the
Fig. 10. The trends in R&D intensity at amazon and apple (2000-2017).
Sources: Amazon.Com, Inc. 2017 annual report (2018a) [35]. Apple Inc. 2017 annual report (2018) [67] .
Table 4
Time dependency on Amazon's R&D intensity (2000-2017).
ln R/S = −273.47 + 0.017 D1 t + 0.135 D2 t + 236.38 D1 adj. R2 0.846 DW
1.51
(-5.13) (0.90)* (5.09) (3.62)
Table 5
Comparison of trends in key managerial factors between amazon and apple (2000-2017).
Sources: Amazon.Com, Inc. 2017 annual report (2018a) [35]. Apple Inc. 2017 annual report (2018) [67].
Amazon Apple
year Sales OI R OI/S R/S OI/R Sales OI R OI/S R/S OI/R
2000 2762 −864 180 −0.31 0.07 −4.80 7983 522 380 0.07 0.05 1.37
2001 3122 −412 138 −0.13 0.04 −2.98 5363 −344 430 −0.06 0.08 −0.80
2002 3933 64 125 0.02 0.03 0.51 5742 17 446 0.00 0.08 0.04
2003 5264 270 257 0.05 0.05 1.05 6207 −1 471 0.00 0.08 0.00
2004 6921 440 283 0.06 0.04 1.55 8279 326 491 0.04 0.06 0.66
2005 8490 432 451 0.05 0.05 0.96 13931 1643 535 0.12 0.04 3.07
2006 10711 389 662 0.04 0.06 0.59 19315 2453 712 0.13 0.04 3.45
2007 14835 655 818 0.04 0.06 0.80 24006 4409 782 0.18 0.03 5.64
2008 19166 842 1033 0.04 0.05 0.82 37491 8327 1109 0.22 0.03 7.51
2009 24509 1129 1240 0.05 0.05 0.91 42905 11740 1333 0.27 0.03 8.81
2010 34204 1406 1734 0.04 0.05 0.81 65225 18385 1782 0.28 0.03 10.32
2011 48077 862 2909 0.02 0.06 0.30 108249 33790 2429 0.31 0.02 13.91
2012 61093 676 4564 0.01 0.07 0.15 156508 55241 3381 0.35 0.02 16.34
2013 74452 745 6565 0.01 0.09 0.11 170910 48999 4475 0.29 0.03 10.95
2014 88988 178 9275 0.00 0.10 0.02 182795 52503 6041 0.29 0.03 8.69
2015 107006 2233 12540 0.02 0.12 0.18 233715 71230 8067 0.30 0.03 8.83
2016 135987 4186 16085 0.03 0.12 0.26 215639 60024 10045 0.28 0.05 5.98
2017 177866 4106 22620 0.02 0.13 0.18 229234 61344 11581 0.27 0.05 5.30
S: Sales, OI: Operating income, R: R&D expenditure. All US$ billion at current prices.
6 The Internet promotes a free culture that provides utility (satisfaction of
consumption) and happiness to people through its consumption but this culture
cannot be captured through GDP data which measure revenue. Such utility and
happiness constituted uncaptured GDP. This can be defined as added value that
provides utility and happiness beyond economic value to people but cannot be
measured by traditional GDP accounts (captured GDP) which measure eco-
nomic value.
7 Supra-functionality beyond economic value illustrates peoples' shifting
preferences which encompass social (e.g., creation of and contribution to social
communication), cultural (e.g., brand value, cool and cute), aspirational (e.g.,
aspiration of traditional beauty), tribal (e.g., cognitive sense, fellow feeling),
and emotional (e.g., perception value, five senses) values [66].
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advancement of the Internet, the increasing dependence on uncaptured
GDP, and people's shifting preferences to beyond an economic value has
been accelerated as illustrated in the upper double circle in Fig. 15
[11–13,46].
Under such a transforming circumstance, highly R&D intensive
economies have been confronting a dilemma [2,9,10,45]. While they
are satisfying people's shifting preferences of supra-functionality be-
yond an economic value, their economic productivity has been de-
clining as R&D (centered on the advancement of the Internet) increases
which is essential to satisfy economic functionality. Amazon cannot be
an exception.
Solution to this critical dilemma can be expected by the hybrid role
of SIRs [1,2].
Use of SIRs is a novel innovation mode applied in the highly
digitalized ICT firms. The authors in previous studies described this
hypothetical view [46] and identified that while such a transformative
circumstance in the digital economy results in productivity decline,
global ICT firms endeavor to survive by spontaneous creation of un-
captured GDP by harnessing the vigor of SIRs [10]. Amazon's endeavor
is one of the typical case.
One more finding from the authors’ previous study is important
background to the analysis described in this paper. It has been de-
monstrated that SIRs function to the removal of structural impediments
of GDP growth such as conflict between public, employers and labor
union, disparity of gender, and also increasing discrepancy toward an
aging society. Thus, spontaneous creation of uncaptured GDP through
effective utilization of SIRs contributes to resurgence of captured GDP
growth by its hybrid function as illustrated in the lower part of Fig. 14
[10,47].
Fig. 15 demonstrates that SIRs awake and activate latent self-pro-
pagating function indigenous to ICT (see the detailed dynamism in Fig.
A1 in the Appendix 2). This activation induces functionality develop-
ment leading to supra-functionality beyond an economic value that
corresponds to people's shift in preferences. Furthermore, SIRs con-
tribute to resurge captured GDP growth by removing structural im-
pediments in this growth. Since supra-functionality accelerates co-
evolutionary innovation among this functionality, the advancement of
the Internet, and uncaptured GDP dependence, SIRs function hybrid
role in balanced advancement of both captured and uncaptured GDP.
Fig. 11. The Trend in Stock Prices in Amazon and Apple (2000-2017) - Index: 2010 = 100. * Stock prices indicate the closing price of each year.
Sources: [39,40].
Table 6
Governing factors of stock prices in amazon and apple (2000-2017).
ln ST=A + b ln OI + c ln R
A b c adj. R2 DW
Amazon −1.035 (−2.22)∗∗ 0.161 (1.63)∗∗∗ 0.657 (9.77)∗ 0.942 2.13
Apple −4.503 (−5.10)∗ 0.433 (4.37)∗ 0.501 (2.49)∗∗ 0.917 1.61
The figures in parentheses indicate t-statistics. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ are significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Note: ST = F (S, OI, R, OCF).
Fig. 12. Comparison of Development Trajectories in Amazon and Apple focusing on Core Inventions.
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Table 7
Identity of Business Model in Amazon and Apple focusing on R&D.
Amazon Apple
Multi-functional products/services High-functional products/services
Not fixated on a tightly designed ecosystem of interlocking apps and services Tightly designed ecosystem
Provide new experiences to customers Provide best experiences to customers
Hardware/software are less capable but the most suitable/fastest services Improve hardware/software every year
Much more attainable More expensive
Explore new types of customers via AWS Rely on creating additional value from existing customers
Fig. 13. The dynamism of amazon in harnessing the power of users.
Source: Authors' elaboration based on [23].
Fig. 14. The dynamism of canon in Co-emerging innovation by harnessing the power of users.
Source: Watanabe (2011).
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4.4. Assimilation of soft innovation resources
Given that emerged SIRs can be well assimilated in the business,
these resources activate a self-propagating function which induces
functionality development leading to supra-functionality beyond an
economic value that satisfies customer's preferences shift without con-
fronting the dilemma between R&D expansion and productivity decline
(see the details of this dynamism in Appendix 2).
Therefore, assimilation capacity of SIRs plays a critical role in cor-
responding to customer's demand: customer obsession for Amazon.
Amazon has developed a high level of this capacity as demonstrated in
Fig. 16.
Fig. 17 outlines a scheme of measuring dynamic assimilation ca-
pacity which demonstrates that Amazon's high level of assimilation
capacity largely depends on its rapid and notable increase in R&D in-
vestment (high level of T
T
i
i
much higher than T
T
s
s
and subsequent high
level of T
T
i
s
).
Recalling SIRs unique role in removing structural impediments in
growth as reviewed earlier, Amazon has effectively utilizes SIRs for
transforming “routine or periodic alterations” into “significant im-
provement” during the R&D process by removing structural impedi-
ments in the former's transformation.
4.5. Enablers of transformation
The above business model has enabled Amazon to absorb external
resources extensively through the Amazon empire chain, big data
Fig. 15. Dynamism in Transforming Amazon into an R&D-driven Business Model. Original source: [44].
Fig. 16. The trend in assimilation capacity in amazon and apple (2001-2017).
Note: Based on the measurement scheme, illustrated as below, where Ti and Ts are used by R and Internet dependence (ID) in the US as proxies, respectively. R and ID
are index (2000= 100).
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collection system and architecture for participation, and assimilate
them into its business.
Given that this model deploys a full-fledged function, it may
transform “routine or periodic alterations” (traditionally classified as
non-R&D) into “significant improvement” (classified as R&D). Amazon
declares that its activities may focus on developing new products and
services, but these activities often result, in whole or in part, in en-
hancements to existing products and services. Web service has imposed
a virtuous pressure that has incentivized everyone to improve reliability
and performance [23].
Such a pressure leverages Amazon to maintain its strong points,
such as having excellent customer service and ensuring complete cus-
tomer satisfaction through such “Species survival and evolution sys-
tems” as. (i) Consistent innovation by means of (a) a peer review
system, (b) easy checkouts, (c) user-tailored suggested products, (d)
making changes proactively, and (ii) Performing disruption analysis on
existing customer data for business changes [49].
A holistic management policy, rather than separate activities con-
tributes to the broad dissemination of this transformation effect. Such
transformation exercises are similar to experiments, which Bezos has
been encouraging, by stressing that “It's not an experiment if you know in
advance it's going to work. If you want to be inventive, you have to ex-
periment a lot, which means you will fail a lot.” He has advised share-
holders that “You need to select people who tend to be dissatisfied by a lot of
the current ways. As they go about their daily experiences, they notice that
little things are broken in the world and they want to fix them. Inventors
have a divine discontent.” Thus, Bezos has characterized the company as
an “invention machine” and inspired its workers to invent and continue
to come up with innovative ideas [50]. The staff within Amazon are
geniuses in their respective fields [51]. Bezos proudly notes that, “We
have the good fortune of a large, inventive team and a patient, pioneering,
customer-obsessed culture-great innovations, large and small, are happening
every day on behalf of customers, and at all levels throughout the company.
This decentralized distribution of invention throughout the company not
limited to the company's senior leaders is the only way to get robust, high-
throughput innovation” [34].
The value created is distributed among various stakeholders: share-
holders, employees, executives, customers, creditors, and suppliers.
Under such a distinct CEO's policy and strong leadership thereof, at
Amazon, experimentation is always occurring, initiated by employees
in broad fields throughout the company, and ideas are constantly being
presented to Bezos, leading to the satisfying of the first leadership
principle: Customer obsession. Motivated employees understand that
these ideas are going to be altered in many ways [33]. Consistent in-
novative thinking is another resource that Amazon has exploited ad-
vantageously [51,52].
This transformation is illustrated in Fig. 18.
It has been popularized the following mathematical formula that
Cash + Willingness to experiment + Stable leadership= Success
(Levinson, 2007). It is evident that the company's unique team of em-
ployees and Jeff Bezos' visionary leadership have been instrumental in
Amazon's success [51].
Unlike Apple, Google, and Microsoft, Amazon is not fixated on a
tightly designed ecosystem of interlocking apps and services as de-
monstrated in Table 7. Bezos instead emphasizes platforms, each of
which serves its customers in the best and fastest possible way. “Our
customers are loyal to us right up until the second somebody offers them a
better service,” he says. “And I love that. It's super-motivating for us.” That
impulse has spawned an awesome stream of creative firsts [53] as if
firing from the top right corner of Fig. 17.
Fig. 17. Scheme of measuring dynamic carrying capacity.
Source: [48].
Fig. 18. Illustration of Amazon's R&D.
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Given this impulse, Amazon may explore a newer R&D model that
also transforms “routine or periodic alterations” into “significant im-
provement” by deploying the full-fledged function of its sophisticated
management system to absorb external resources extensively and as-
similate them into its business.
4.6. Leading to self-propagating R&D initiatives
The above analysis leads us to expect that Amazon's R&D model
may provide a solution to a critical problem that the majority of ICT
leaders have been confronting within the digital economy: the dilemma
between R&D expansion and productivity decline [1,2]. This solution
can be anticipated by activating a self-propagating function indigenous
to ICT development [54]. This activation can be enabled by assimilating
SIRs, as illustrated in Fig. 15, rather than depending on R&D expansion.
Thus, provided that Amazon's above business model: (Absorption of
external resources + assimilation in own business + impulse towards cus-
tomer obsession Transform “routine or periodic alterations” into “sig-
nificant improvement”) functioned as designed, investment used for this
R&D model (investment of technology and the content of its annual
report, as summarized in Table 3) should have duly emerged as a self-
propagating function.
In order to demonstrate this hypothetical view, a comparative
analysis of technology-driven development trajectories between
Amazon and Apple over a period from 2000 to 2017 was conducted.8
As far as the development trajectory depends on the simple logistic
growth (SLG) trajectory, its market value (Vs(T)) saturates with a fixed
upper limit (N). However, once the trajectory shifts to logistic growth
within a dynamic carrying capacity (LGDCC) trajectory that in-
corporates a self-propagating function, the upper limit dynamically
enhances as growth proceeds, thereby its digital value (VL(T)) can
continue to increase supported by this function [54].
Recalling particular innovation that creates new carrying capacity
during the process of diffusion (e.g., Internet, functional mobile phones,
and smartphones), transforming endeavor against the preceding di-
lemma corresponds to shifting from SLG to LGDCC trajectory [2] as
illustrated in Fig. 19.
Fig. 20 and Table 8 examine the development trajectories in
Amazon and Apple over the period from 2000 to 2017 by comparing
SLG and LGDCC.9
Looking at Fig. 20 we note that, while Apple attempted to shift from
a SLG to a LGDCC trajectory, it has not entirely transformed into
LGDCC, as its LGDCC trajectory is not necessarily statistically
significant, as demonstrated in Table 8, and the magnitude of its self-
propagating function has been limited, as demonstrated in Fig. 20.
Consequently, its market value has been accessing a plateau. Contrary
to such a trajectory in Apple, Amazon has continued to increase its
market value depending on the LGDCC trajectory, with a notable
magnitude of self-propagating function, as demonstrated in Fig. 20.
The contrast in this market value trajectory between Apple and
Amazon, while the former has been accessing a plateau and the latter
has been continued to increase, can be endorsed by the trend in their
number of patent applications, as demonstrated in Fig. 21. Since
market value (V) increase induces R&D investment, leading to tech-
nology knowledge stock (T) increase, which is proportional to the
number of patent applications (P), as demonstrated in Table 9 in R&D-
driven firms like Apple and Amazon, trends in their P have close re-
levance to their V trends (see the details of P trends in GAFA in Table
A3 in Appendix 3).
Table 8 demonstrates that, contrary to Apple, which incorporates a
certain statistical insignificance in its LGDCC trajectory, Amazon has
developed an explicit technology-driven self-propagating function, as
the LGDCC is statistically more significant than the SLG. This can be
attributed to its unique R&D model. While investment used for this R&D
model is described in its annual report as investment of technology
(centered on expenses for employees and infrastructure costs directly
linked to significant improvement) and content (including those for
routine or periodic alterations), as summarized in Table 3, technology
knowledge stock constructed by both investments demonstrated a duly
emerged self-propagating function essential for overcoming the crucial
problem in the digital economy.
This fact demonstrates that Amazon successfully transformed
“routine or periodic alterations” into “significant improvement” suffi-
ciently enough to overcome the critical problem in the digital economy.
In addition, Table 9 endorses the fact that Amazon's technology
Fig. 19. Amazon's R&D-driven development trajectory.
Table 8
Comparison of R&D-driven development trajectory between amazon and apple
(2000-2017).
N a b ak bk adj. R2
Amazon SLG 310.153
(17.96)
0.484
(6.76)
11.739
(3.56)
0.954
LGDCC 733.090 0.166 11.384 0.039 0.140 0.999
(3.28) (27.94) (2.55)* (12.93) (3.10)
Apple SLG 539.796 1.053 94.632 0.980
(30.16) (9.66) (11.67)
LGDCC 652.458 1.534 403.500 0.164 1.100 0.996
(5.33) (8.77) (1.21)** (2.44)* (3.19)
The figures in parentheses indicate t-statistics: all are significant at the 1% level
except *5% and **25% level, respectively.
8 See the details of the numerical analysis and data construction for the
analysis in Table A2 in Appendix 3.
9 Estimation of LGDCC depended on the three-steps approximation approach
[15].
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knowledge stock, constructed by both investments of technology and
content, demonstrates similar performance to Amazon's technology
stock by generating patent applications, which are generally considered
as outcomes of innovation.
Thus, we could conclude that Amazon's unique R&D model and
subsequent unique R&D investment convince us of the significance of
the transformation of the R&D concept in the digital economy.
5. Conclusion
In light of a rapid conspicuous increase in Amazon's R&D elevated it
to the position of world's top R&D firm in 2017 based on its unique R&D
model, and subsequent debate on the new concept of R&D in the digital
economy, the transformative direction of R&D was examined.
By an empirical analysis focusing on Amazon's R&D-driven dis-
ruptive business model, a new concept of R&D in neo open innovation
that harnesses the vigor of soft innovation resources was investigated.
It was identified that Amazon, which is based on R&D as a culture,
has been promoting companywide experimentation to cause customers
obsessed with making purchase decisions. This has enabled Amazon to
deploy an architecture for participation that makes the most of digital
technologies by harnessing the power of users. Such user-driven in-
novation accelerated a dramatic advancement of the Internet that, in
turn, accelerated the co-emergence of soft innovation resources in the
marketplace. This emergence activated a self-propagating function that
induced functionality development, leading to supra-functionality be-
yond an economic value that satisfies a shift in customers’ preferences,
which Amazon has been treating as the highest priority. While this
system depends on the assimilation capacity of soft innovation re-
sources, Amazon has developed a high level of capacity, supported by a
rapid and notable increase in R&D investment. Such a sophisticated
management system has operated well because of strong inertia in-
duced by the strongly customer-centric visionary leadership of Jeff
Bezos (founder and CEO of Amazon), together with motivated, brilliant
and consistently innovative employees equipped with species survival
and an evolution system that watches for the necessity of disruptive
Fig. 20. Trends in technology-driven market value growth trajectory .in amazon and apple (2000-2017).
Fig. 21. Trend in number of patent applications in amazon and apple (2004-2018).
Source: [55].
Table 9
Correlation between technology knowledge stock and number of patent applications in amazon and apple (2004-2018).
Amazon ln P = 4.25 + 1.38 ln T – 0.90 D adj. R2 0.970 DW 1.62 D: 2018= 1, other years= 0
(41.06) (19.77) (-2.71)*
Apple ln P = 6.56 + 0.88 ln T – 0.85 D adj. R2 0.901 DW 1.25 D: 2004-2006, 2018=1, other years= 0
(38.06) (9.02) (-5.48)
P: number of patent applications; T: technology knowledge stock; and D: dummy variables.
The figures in parentheses indicate t-statistics; a;; are significant at the 1% level except * 2%.
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business change. These efforts function as a virtuous cycle, leading to
the transformation of “routine or periodic alterations” into “significant
improvement.”
This virtuous cycle was demonstrated by a numerical empirical
analysis showing that technological knowledge stock consisting of in-
vestment for both activities has duly emerged as a self-propagating
function essential for overcoming the critical problem in the digital
economy.
These findings give rise to the following insightful suggestions for
reconstructing the R&D model in the digital economy, which in-
corporates a two-faced nature and a subsequent dilemma between R&D
expansion and productivity decline:
(i) The system of neo open innovation should be specified more on the
basis of priority.
(ii) The role of assimilated soft innovation resources in transforming
“routine or periodic alteration” into “significant improvement”
should be further analyzed.
(iii) Dynamism in increasing assimilation capacity via user-driven in-
novation, M&A and big data collection systems should be eluci-
dated.
(iv) The development of assimilation capacity should be explored fur-
ther.
(v) The accounting principle of R&D in the digital economy should be
reviewed.
(vi) The sophistication of Amazon's R&D-driven business model against
the “new monopoly” in the digital economy should be further
generalized.
This analysis provides new insights for shedding light on exploring a
practical solution to the dilemma between R&D expansion and pro-
ductivity decline in the digital economy.
Future works should focus on further elucidation of the micro-dy-
namism of transformation of “routine or periodic alteration” into
“significant improvement.” Further identification of systems effects of R
&D between Amazon's R&D model and models initiated by other net-
work firms should also be focused on.
A priority of the national innovation system in the digital economy
should be to accumulate the lessons from the new concept of R&D in-
itiated by Amazon and use them to establish a new concept of R&D in
neo open innovation. A government-initiated R&D ecosystem should be
developed to complement the possible deficits of this new concept,
particularly in smaller firms. This, in turn, will induce further sophis-
tication of the Amazon model as a comprehensive system.
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Appendix 1. Definition of Research and Development
Table A1
Activities Typically Included and Excluded from R&D
Activities typically included in R&D (730-10-55-1) b. Laboratory research aimed at discovery of new knowledge
c. Searching for applications of new research findings or other knowledge
d. Conceptual formulation and design of the possible product or process alternatives
e. Testing in search for or evaluation of product or process alternatives
f. Modification of the formulation or design of a product or process
g. Design, construction, and testing of preproduction prototypes and models
h. Design of tools, jigs, molds, and dies involving new technology
i. Design, construction, and operation of a pilot plant that is not of a scale economically feasible to the entity for commercial production
j. Engineering activity required to advance the design of a product to the point that it meets specific functional and economic requirements and is ready for manufacture
k. Design and development of tools used to facilitate research and development or components of a product or process that are undergoing research and development activities.
Activities typically excluded from R&D (730-10-55-2) a. Engineering follow-through in an early phase of commercial production
b. Quality control during commercial production including routine testing of products
c. Trouble-shooting in connection with break-downs during commercial production
d. Routine, ongoing efforts to refine, enrich, or otherwise improve upon the qualities of an existing product
e. Adaptation of an existing capability to a particular requirement or customer's need as part of a continuing commercial activity
f. Seasonal or other periodic design changes to existing products
g. Routine design of tools, jigs, molds, and dies
h. Activity, including design and construction engineering, related to the construction, relocation, rearrangement, or start-up of facilities or equipment other than the following:
1. Pilot plants (see [h] in the preceding paragraph)
2. Facilities or equipment whose sole use is for a particular R&D project i. Legal work in connection with patent applications or litigation, and the sale or licensing of patents.
Source: US generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in Definition of R&D by [56].
Appendix 2. Dynamism of the Solution to Dilemma
Digital value V created by an IoT society can be depicted as follows [9,57]:=V F X T( , ) (1)
where T: gross ICT stock; X: other production factors.
Translog (transcendental logarithmic) expansion on the first term:= + +lnV p q lnX r lnT (2)
where p, q, and r: coefficients.
T embodies into X in an IoT society as follows:
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X= F(T) lnX= px + rx lnT (3)
where px and rx: coefficients.
Synchronizing equations (2) and (3):
lnV= p + q(px + rxlnT) + rlnT = (p + q·px) + (q·rx + r)lnT ≡ α + β lnT
(4)
where α= p + q·Px, β= q·rx + r.
This demonstrates that V is governed by T as follows under the above circumstances.
V = F(T) (5)
Given the logistic growth nature of ICT, V can be developed by an T-driven logistic growth function.
= = =V F T dV
dT
V
T
dT
dT
V
T
aV V
N
( ), 1 (6)
where N: carrying capacity; and a: velocity of diffusion.
Equation (6) develops the following simple logistic growth function (SLG):
= +V T Nbe( ) 1s aT (7)
where b: coefficient indicating the initial level of diffusion; VS(T): T-driven SLG-based development trajectory.
In particular innovation which creates new carrying capacity N(T) during the process of diffusion, equation (6) is developed as follows:
=dV T
dT
aV T V T
N T
( ) ( ) 1 ( )
( ) (8)
Equation (8) develops the following logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity function (LGDCC) as depicted in equation (9) which
incorporates self-propagating function as carrying capacity (NL(T)) increases corresponding to VL(T) (T-driven LGDCC-based development trajectory)
increase as depicted in equation (10) [2,54]:
= + +V T Nbe e( ) 1L kaT ba a a T1 /kk k (9)
= =N T V T V T dV T
dT
( ) ( ) 1
1
( ) ( )L L
a
V T
V T
L
L
1 ( )
( )
L
L (10)
Equation (10) suggests that self-propagating function can be activated as growth rate of VL(T) increases.
From equation (5), this rate is depicted as follows:
=V T
V T
V T
T
T
V T
T
T
V T
T
R
V T
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
L
L
L
L
L
L (11)
where R: R&D expenditure ( T).
Equation (11) suggests that activation of self-propagating function by increasing growth rate depends on increases in marginal productivity of
technology ( )V T and R&D intensity (R/V).
Given the declining trend in marginal productivity of technology in the digital economy due to two-faced nature of ICT,10growth rate increase
can be expected by increasing R&D intensity. However, considering the dilemma between R&D expansion and productivity decline that R&D-
intensive firms have been confronting, only a solution can be found through effective utilization of external innovation resources, centered on soft
innovation resources (SIRs) from external market [2] as illustrated in Fig. A1.
Fig. A1. Dynamism in Assimilating External Innovation Resources for Sustainable Growth.
10 While advancement of ICT generally contributes to enhanced prices of technology by new functionality development, the dramatic advancement of the Internet
reacts to decreased prices of technology due to its nature of freebies, easy and free replication, and mass standardization [11].
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Amazon's endeavor in transforming resources for “routine or periodic alterations” activities into resources functioning “significant improvement”
by absorbing soft innovation resources from the external market and assimilating them in its business can provide practical solution to this dilemma
as illustrated in Fig. A2.
Fig. A2. Dynamism of Amazon's Transforming Routine or Periodic Alterations into Significant Improvement. R: R&D expenditure; K: tangible assets, SIRs: soft
innovation resources.
Appendix 3. Statistics for the Analysis
Table A2
Trend in Sales, R&D, Market Value and Technology Knowledge Stock in Amazon and Apple (2000-2017) – US$ billion at 2010 fixed prices (except indicated as
nominal) [6,35,67].
Amazon Apple
Year Sn (nominal) Rn (nominal) Sr (real) Rr (real) V T Sn (nominal) Rn (nominal) Sr (real) Rr (real) V T Deflator(2010=100)
2000 2.8 0.2 3.4 0.2 4.2 0.2 8.0 0.4 9.9 0.4 7.8 1.8 81
2001 3.1 0.1 3.8 0.2 6.7 0.4 5.4 0.4 6.5 0.5 11.9 1.8 83
2002 3.9 0.1 4.7 0.1 9.4 0.5 5.7 0.4 6.8 0.5 15.2 1.9 84
2003 5.3 0.3 6.1 0.3 12.7 0.6 6.2 0.5 7.2 0.6 17.9 2.0 86
2004 6.9 0.3 7.9 0.3 16.7 0.7 8.3 0.5 9.4 0.6 21.9 2.1 88
2005 8.5 0.5 9.3 0.5 21.1 0.7 13.9 0.5 15.3 0.6 30.7 2.2 91
2006 10.7 0.7 11.4 0.7 26.2 0.8 19.3 0.7 20.6 0.8 42.1 2.3 94
2007 14.8 0.8 15.4 0.9 33.8 1.0 24.0 0.8 25.0 0.8 54.4 2.4 96
2008 19.2 1.0 19.5 1.1 43.2 1.3 37.5 1.1 38.2 1.1 76.3 2.5 98
2009 24.5 1.2 24.8 1.3 55.0 1.7 42.9 1.3 43.4 1.3 96.9 2.8 99
2010 34.2 1.7 34.2 1.7 72.7 2.2 65.2 1.8 65.2 1.8 133.0 3.0 100
2011 48.1 2.9 47.1 2.9 98.0 2.8 108.2 2.4 106.1 2.4 199.2 3.6 102
2012 61.1 4.6 58.8 4.4 127.4 3.5 156.5 3.4 150.6 3.3 290.0 4.2 104
2013 74.5 6.6 70.5 6.2 159.7 4.6 170.9 4.5 161.8 4.2 364.9 5.1 106
2014 89.0 9.3 82.8 8.6 194.5 6.5 182.8 6.0 170.0 5.6 425.4 6.5 108
2015 107.0 12.5 98.4 11.5 234.6 9.6 233.7 8.1 215.0 7.4 512.8 8.4 109
2016 136.0 16.9 123.5 14.6 287.8 13.9 215.6 10.0 195.9 9.1 554.9 11.0 110
2017 177.9 22.6 158.7 20.2 360.2 19.7 229.2 11.6 204.6 10.3 593.0 14.4 112
S: Sales, R: R&D expenditure, V: Market value, T: Technology knowledge stock [58].
= + = + = + = +V S V V S T R T T R g(1 ) , , (1 )t t t t t m t m1 0 1 1, 0 1
where : Rate of depreciation of sold goods and services; : Rate of obsolescence of technology; m: Leadtime between R&D and commercialization;
: Growth rate of goods and services at initial stage; g: Growth rate of R&D at initial stage.
Based on the empirical reviews of typical goods, services and R&D in both companies over a period from 1995 to 2015, together with literature
reviews, respective factors were estimated as follows [14,16,17,59–64]:= 0.3, = 0.2, m=3 years in both companies. = 20% p.a (Amazon) and 15% p.a (Apple). g= 25% p.a (Amazon) and 5% p.a (Apple).
Original sources: Amazon.Com, Inc., 2017 annual report (2018a). Apple Inc., 2017 annual report (2018). [65].
Table A3
The Trend in Number of Patent Application in GAFA (2004-2018)
Year Google Apple Facebook Amazon
2004 1783 534 186 24
2005 1587 565 188 55
2006 1813 645 209 46
2007 2202 925 221 60
2008 2003 1484 786 120
2009 1618 1685 236 143
2010 1791 2092 302 216
2011 1828 2451 333 306
2012 2980 3150 322 469
2013 4021 4368 749 806
2014 5338 4926 1055 1269
2015 6519 4429 933 1843
2016 5515 4935 1310 2249
2017 5237 4731 1780 2629
2018 4291 4407 1743 2732
Source: [55].
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